Xi in ROK: a breath of realism

China is well known as a country that holds an especially pivotal position in the tangled affairs of the Korean peninsula, as a nation which has maintained good relations with both Koreas and has possessed influence accordingly. But hitherto it has been Chinese policy to avoid antagonizing the vulnerable and sensitive leadership of the DPRK by creating any impression that South Korea may be in any way the preferred partner. However, President Xi Jinping has now avoided sending placatory signals to Pyongyang, and has simply gone ahead with a full state visit to Seoul, before arranging any sort of meeting with the DPRK's Kim Jong-un. No previous Chinese leader has visited Seoul before visiting Pyongyang.

One need not interpret this as a real change in China's position on the Korean peninsula; it is more a sign of a preference for reality over symbolism. The DPRK is an old ally of China, whereas diplomatic relations with the South dates only back to 1992. However, everyone knows that during the last twenty years the substantive economic and political relations with Seoul have far outstripped those with Pyongyang. The China/ROK bilateral trading relationship is one of the world's largest, with trade between them reaching US$274 billion last year. In comparison, Chinese trade with the DPRK is still less than US$7 billion.

Also there is one political issue on which China and the Republic of Korea stand absolutely shoulder to shoulder: the denuclearization of the peninsula. True, the two leaders expressed this in different ways; when the joint communiqué between the two presidents was announced, the Chinese version referred to "denuclearisation of the peninsula" whereas President Park Geun-hye spoke of "denuclearisation of North Korea." But everybody knows that there is no immediate danger of nuclear weapons being deployed in South Korea; these would have to be provided by the United States, and the United States would never be so stupidly provocative.

How has the DPRK reacted to the impending visit of the Chinese President to Seoul? China is still endorsing the North Korean position supporting the restart of the six-party talks on the North's denuclearisation, but the DPRK has shown no sign of slowing down the nuclear weapons development program. This has surely shown the Chinese side that support for the six-party talks is a symbolic position rather than a realistic one. Pyongyang carried out its third underground atomic test in February 2013. And on June 29 North Korea announced a test-launch of two short-range Scud missiles, which formed part of an established series of missile firings. On July 2 two short-range rockets were fired from North Korea's east coast.

But no-one is really in a position to exercise a decisive influence on North Korea's nuclear development. And the major Chinese concern in these talks was not North or South Korea. The Chinese interest is in neutralising the U.S.-Japan axis, and it has become clear that South Korea, though a U.S. ally, cannot be too happy about the current U.S. position of fervent support for Japan, including the absence of any U.S. opposition to Premier Abe's reinterpretation of the post-war pacifist constitution. The United States will have to manage its network of allies in East Asia very carefully; any sign of excessive closeness to Japan risks alienating more than one country on which the United States will need to rely in any strategy for counterbalancing Chinese influence. Here South Korea presents a real opportunity for China to take advantage of any disappointment felt by a U.S. ally.