What is behind the spying indictment?

But strategies like these require a theory to back them up. A distinction was therefore invented by the brain trust to differentiate military and intelligence uses of cyberspace from other uses. Just like conventional military and intelligence operations, any cyber attack that serves military and intelligence uses is deemed by the United States as legitimate; other cyber attacks, however, are attributed to the civilian field and deemed industrial spying or commercial theft activity that are illegal, with the national interest often used as a trump card.

Armed with this theory, the United States has undertaken a wave of actions. In its dialogues with China, the United States has argued that militarization has become an intrinsic demand for cyberspace. But when confronted with accusations such as the Stuxnet virus that attacks Iran's nuclear capabilities and the Prism program that monitors heads of states, Uncle Sam understated it as avoiding regional military conflicts or conducting anti-terrorism activities. Even the NSA's infiltration into Huawei, exposed by the former agency contractor Edward Snowden, was mentioned lightly as looking for evidence of threats against U.S. national security.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said last Monday that China would suspend activities in the China-U.S. Cyber Working Group following the indictment. When the working group was first set up, the United States highlighted its intention to resolve the alleged Chinese industrial espionage. The United States keeps saying that actions would be taken if the bottom line was crossed. And if we look at the assessment reports issued by the U.S. government or Washington-backed companies, we find that all of them are follow the theory.

We have seen one action after another taken by the United States -- the Congressional investigation into Chinese companies ZTE and Huawei, the company Mandiant's report on "Chinese cyber espionage units," the Department of Defense's report on "industrial espionage," and FireEye's report "Understanding Nation-State Motives Behind Today's Advanced Cyber Attacks." And now, action has been pushed to the court.

The United States has staged an indictment farce when it is still embroiled in the aftermath of the notorious Prism program. What hangs over our head is the sword of Damocles: we should alert ourselves to the risks in national cyber security. For those on the other side of the Pacific who still harbor a Cold War mentality and bear a grudge against China's achievements, I say to a them a catchphrase that is popular now in China -- "No zuo no die" (if you don't do stupid things, they won't come back to bite you).

The author is from the China Information Security Research Institute.

This article was translated by Zhang Lulu. Its original unabridged version was published in Chinese.