10 differences between China and the West on Tibet

U.S. President Barack Obama met the Dalai Lama on Feb. 21 in the White House for the third time, kicking off another round of the show of Western leaders meeting the Dalai Lama.

Responding to China's outcry against the meeting, calling Dalai Lama a political exile and the commander of anti-China secessionist activities, the White House claimed that Dalai Lama was received as "an internationally respected religious and cultural leader."

How to address Dalai Lama is only a part of the divergence between China and the West on the Tibet issue. There are ten others reflecting differences on core values concerning human rights, freedom, autonomy and cultural diversity.

First, Western countries have mixed up sovereignty with suzerainty due to their memory of colonial history. Great Britain did not recognize China's sovereignty over Tibet until the Beijing Olympic Torch Relay incident in Paris. A Chinese torchbearer was attacked when she was carrying the Olympic torch amid political protests denouncing Chinese policy in Tibet on April 7, 2008. Before that, the U.K. only recognized China's suzerainty over Tibet. Britons are still criticizing China's colonial rule over Tibet, seemingly repeating their old mistakes.

Second is the mysterious Lama culture. Since Marco Polo's travelogue was published, Westerners have seen China as a country full of gold, spices and myths. As the birthplace of Lama culture, Tibet is a mysterious paradise in their minds.

Third is the Westerners' Shangri-la complex. After the Beijing Olympic torch relay was interrupted in Paris and London in 2008, the then Minister Mentor of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew pointed out "the gulf in understanding between Chinese and Westerners" in his article "Two Images of China" in Forbes. He cited an example of Tibet, saying, "The West has always thought of Tibet as a romantic Shangri-la, hidden in the Himalayas, populated by a meditating Dalai Lama and monks in serene monasteries. For China, Tibet was a backward society of feudal landlords that kept its farmers illiterate serfs."

Fourth is the nostalgia for theocracy. The West has abolished the integration of religion and politics during the Reformation. But it still has nostalgia for Tibetan theocracy. The Dalai Lama has been shaped as a legend in the West, with political hype, movies, books and curiosity about Tibetan religion. He has fascinated Westerners as a Nobel laureate and spiritual leader. Therefore, Western politicians like to meet him to gain social support and favors.

Fifth is the religion and human rights protection issue. Karl Marx once wrote that "Religion is the opiate of the masses." Therefore, Westerners believe that the atheistic Communists are against religion and cannot respect and protect Tibetan Buddhism. Their defensive mentality on human rights and freedom of religion has been further enhanced with the Dalai Lama's propaganda on the devastation of cultural and religious relics in the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).

Sixth is the concept of anti-modernization as well as ecological and cultural protection in Tibet. Having experienced industrialization and environmental pollution, Westerners are keen to protect original ecosystems and cultures. They hope Tibet can be preserved and protected as a museum and oppose development and destruction. In fact, the Tibet issue in Westerners' minds is an aesthetic issue. As the "superior nation," they appreciate the original environment and social system in Tibet and cannot see that reform and development in Tibet is based on abolishing agricultural serfdom.

Seventh is how to respect and protect the rights and interests of ethnic minorities. The arguments on the Tibet issue between China and the West have always focused on the protection of religion and human rights. Westerners understand neither China's policies on regional autonomy nor the actual conditions in Tibet. Most of them rely on the media to get news about Tibet and presume that Tibetans cannot get proper protection for their rights.

Eighth is ignoring Dalai Lama's leadership in political affairs. Few people in the West know the Dalai's political status in Tibet. Most of them see him as a spiritual leader or even an icon of Buddhism. They know little about the Indian-based caste system and the history before the agricultural serfdom emancipation. Their knowledge about Tibet mostly comes from Dalai Lama's biographies and Western works which are the result of a selective memory.

Ninth, the Dalai Lama's view of fighting for Tibet's independence through non-violence practice has not only echoed Mahatma Gandhi's spirit, but has also reflected Westerners' ideals. As an exile in India, he has been mentioned alongside Mahatma Gandhi and worshiped by many Westerners.

Tenth is the nation-state notion. In Westerners' view of history, the collapse of an empire will produce many modern nation-states. For example, after the First World War, the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed and modern countries like Austria and Hungary were established. Therefore, they think Tibet should be independent after the collapse of the old Chinese Empire. They do not understand the Chinese people's historical concept of unification nor their identities as a nation. In their opinion, Tibetans are not Chinese and Tibet does not belong to China.

All in all, the Tibet issue has challenged Westerners' historical memories, values and beliefs. That's why Western leaders constantly meet with the Dalai Lama, despite China's opposition. Westerners often misunderstand the Tibet conditions on purpose, based on their own thinking pattern. They use democracy and human rights as mirrors to contrast with other countries. These divergences cannot be bridged until the West has changed its moral defender mentality; the idea that it is the representative of universal values and others are aliens.

The author is a senior research fellow at the Charhar Institute, and dean of the School of International Studies at Renmin University.

This article was translated by Li Shen. Its original unabridged version was published in Chinese.