News Analysis: Tough challenges ahead for sweeping reform plan in Iraq

Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi is facing hard options as his anti-corruption reform plan is crucial for battling Islamic State (IS) militants, but put him at odds with protesters as well as with political process which was built on consensus among competing political rivals.

MILITARY CHALLENGE IN ANBAR, SALAHUDIN

The liberation of Salahudin provincial capital city of Tikrit late in March was seen as the beginning of a series of IS pull-out from Iraqi cities, but the IS group made a surprise success in the heartland of Sunni Arabs when the militants seized Anbar's provincial capital city of Ramadi in mid-May.

The fall of Ramadi was seen as the group's biggest success since the capture of Iraq's northern city of Mosul last year.

The extremist militants also showed insistence in fighting the government troops and sometimes defeated them in the northern areas of Salahudin province and in Anbar, as the two sides involved in fierce tug-of-war battles around the IS-held cities in Anbar as well as in Salahudin's town of Baiji, some 200 km north of Baghdad, and its nearby Iraq's largest oil refinery.

The IS in the two provinces proved that it has the maneuverability to carry out major attacks across the Sunni provinces despite the U.S.-led coalition and Iraqi airstrikes.

Observers see that the liberation of Ramadi and other key cities in Anbar province will be more complex and difficult than the recapture of Tikrit, as the province has long been a hub for powerful Sunni insurgency. Its geographic complexity, expansive deserts and multiple borders made its security task the most difficult.

Anbar province is the largest province in Iraq, it constitutes about one-third of Iraq's territory and borders the provinces of Babil, Baghdad, Karbala, Najaf, Salahudin and Nineveh. It also stretches to the borders with Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria.

The fall of Ramadi was a major setback Abadi's efforts to defeat the IS. While he was trying to pursue a U.S.-backed approach in fighting against IS by recruiting local Sunni tribes to fight for their cities and town instead of the Shiite militias of the Hashd Shaabi in order to avoid sectarian tensions in the Sunni heartland of Anbar province.

However, the rapid retreat of security forces and allied militias from Ramadi without fight pushed Abadi, who is also the commander-in-chief of Iraqi armed forces, to order the mainly Shiite militias of Hashd Shaabi, or popular mobilization, to participate in battles against IS militants in Anbar, ignoring U.S. concerns that the presence of Shiite militias could spark sectarian strife.

The deteriorating situation of the Iraqi army and police forced Abadi to depend on Shiite militias who are better organized, having faith and ready to sacrifice, unlike the soldiers who work for the salaries.

The Americans apparently were disappointed from Abadi's slow and ineffective measures in reaching out to the Sunni community, as the U.S. administration sees that it is crucial to bring Sunni tribal fighters, who are the land owners, to the battlefield.

The Sunnis believe that a large presence of Sunni paramilitaries within the Hashd Shaabi units, or even separately is necessary to reduce the fears of the Sunni residents of possible burning and looting their homes by the Shiite militias based on sectarian and revenge motives like what happened in the cities of Tikrit, Dour and other towns and villages in Salahudin province, which the security forces and allied Shiite militias freed them from IS extremists.

So far, Iraqi security forces and allied militias known as Hashd Shaabi are making modest and slow progress in their battles with IS militants in the two provinces.

The Iraqi government apparently has abandoned its hope for rapid progress to retake control of the IS-held cities and towns in the two provinces, as its officials repeatedly announced.

Ibrahim al-Ameri, a lecturer of politics at Baghdad University, told Xinhua "the vast open land in Anbar, inefficiency and corruption in security forces, sensitivity of sending Shiite militias to Sunni heartland, in addition to infighting of Iraqi factions in the political process, forced Baghdad to shift to long-term battles in Anbar."

The deliberate slow approach in the battles was aimed at pushing IS group to fight in multiple isolated fronts, by imposing siege on key cities of Ramadi and Fallujah, as well as small IS-held towns in Anbar and Salahudin, and to tighten grip on rural areas around the IS-held cities to prevent logistic reinforcement of militants inside, according to Ameri.

"It is a problem related to the portion of area size to the size of forces. They (the Iraqi government) don't have enough troops to hold the areas," Ameri said.

"Therefore, it is essential to bring Sunni tribal fighters in Anbar to battlefield by arming and training them in order to support the security forces in the geographic complex areas," Ameri concluded.

However, Abadi's efforts to bring Sunni recruits to the battleground were hampered by the embattled political parties, who failed to enact a law to form the national guard from tribal Sunni fighters in order to join the Shiite-dominated security forces. Nevertheless, several thousands of Sunni tribesmen formed groups to fight back the IS presence with the support of several hundreds of U.S. advisors.

ABADI'S REFORM PLAN AND DIFFECULTIES AHEAD

Almost a year passed since September 2014, when Abadi formed his cabinet and pledged to carry out reforms to the fragile political process, but the struggle between the divided political parties made it hard for him to come up with tangible reforms.

Earlier in the month, Abadi found his opportunity to present his reform plan when thousands of angry Iraqis demonstrated in Baghdad and several other cities in southern the country, protesting against massive corruption, incompetency, poverty, slack public services and power shortage during the scorching summer temperatures which usually soar in Iraq to almost 50 degrees Celsius.

Abadi's ambitious reform plan was also backed by Iraq's most revered Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who asked Abadi to be "more daring and courageous in his reforms."

The huge pressure by the demonstrations and full support from the Marjiyah (Shiite religious leadership) forced the infighting political parties to show rare unity in backing Abadi's plan in both the cabinet and the parliament.

Abadi announced a package of reforms, including abolishing the three posts of vice president and three deputy premier posts, as well as cutting 11 of his cabinet posts, in addition to slashing the number of guards for senior officials.

Abadi's reform plan gained popular support but fell short to convince many demonstrators who continued their protests and set up tents in the cities of Basra and Hilla, demanding Abadi to be more aggressive against the political parties who benefit from the corruption and could reverse the reforms to their own benefit.

Many parties in the country's political process have their own militias and gained their own influence and power through years of bloody sectarian turf war across the country. Those parties were funding their activities by graft, while most have strong links and endless support from several neighboring countries.

Sabah al-Sheikh, a political analyst, told Xinhua that Abadi is facing corruption and mismanagement, besides the grave threat of IS, which has seized large parts of the country.

"If Abadi makes tangible reforms, that would be a great move to curb the sectarian struggle in the country as long as the reforms can produce social justice and curb corruption," Sheikh said.

"Genuine reform would give hope to disenfranchised Sunni community which would feel that coexistence is still possible in unified state, and would give a push to national reconciliation, and eventually would encourage Sunni tribes to take part in fighting against IS extremist militants to free the IS-held cities," he added.

If it succeeded, Abadi's reform plan could change Iraq's future and would promote stability and economic development, which would certainly heighten the morale of the troops who are facing the IS terrorist group in Anbar and Salahudin and would help liberate Mosul in the north later.

However, Ameri see that Abadi's reform measures won't be easy, as each political party is ready to fight to save their gains, among which the state ministries that became part of their own property and were working for their own interests not for nationwide interests.

Such difficulty would also be in his own Islamic Dawa Party and its powerful and influential leader, former prime minister Nuri al-Maliki.

"Maliki is widely accused by Iraqis of graft. He was also accused by a fact-finding parliamentary committee of dereliction in duty during the fall of Mosul to IS group," Ameri said.

"Maliki is still powerful, as he and his party members gained wealth and power allegedly by graft, while he has dozens of thousands of supporters who were granted jobs and salaries in many government-owned offices created for them during his eight years in office just to buy their loyalty," Ameri said, adding that Malik is also backed by neighboring Iran.

However, Ameri dismissed the possibility of military coup in Iraq by Maliki or any other party, "because nobody would like to be in his place; as the man is facing a unique situation, he narrowly has to choose one of two options; either to challenge the corrupt influential politicians and powerful parties, including his own Islamic Dawa Party, or to conduct limited reforms that would lead him to lose the support of the people and Marjiyah. It would be like a political suicide."

"All other parties wish to bypass this stage with minimum of loss, as the demands of the protests are very difficult. They want Abadi to fix the mistakes of 12 years of failed governance in one or two months," Ameri said.

For his part, Ayad Jamal al-Din, a Shiite cleric and former member of parliament, asserted that what Iraq needs is a change in the whole political process not only reforms.

"What we need is a roadmap that may take Iraq from this miserable situation to new horizons. Abadi's reform plan is not enough and I don't expect it would end the protests soon," Jamal al-Din said.

He added that disbanding militias must be the first step toward any reform plan, as disbanding militias would means freeing the judiciary system and the people from fear.

"You can't prosecute a corrupt or a criminal unless it would be in front of free and non-corrupt judiciary," Jamal al-Din said.

"The influence of leading Islamic political parties is not because people believe in their values, and certainly not because what they achieved from services to people, but because those parties got militias," he said.

Jamal al-Din, best known of his call for a state free of religion, i.e. separating religion from politics, also said that he don't expect Abadi would be able to make a real change by his reform because he won't be able to prosecute his old comrade and powerful leader in Dawa Party Nuri Maliki.

"Do not expect that Haider al-Abadi would put Nuri al-Maliki in Jail. Not Abadi and not anyone else. Nobody can prosecute Maliki," Jamal al-Din said referring to Abadi's relation to Maliki and the fear of his influence. Endit