Despite the fact that the White House has finally recognized that compromises with regard to China's exchange rate are more receptive than coercion, exemplified by last month's surprise visit by United States Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, a higher renminbi rate is still not the one-off solution for the US' predicaments.

Even though the Obama administration postponed a report that would label China a currency manipulator, the road of recovery for the US will be long and arduous and is hampered by its over-leveraged consumers.

With the US' midterm elections approaching, it was not difficult to understand why lawmakers on Capitol Hill desperately needed a scapegoat - aka China - to divert its discontent masses. And though President Hu Jintao's attendance recently at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington was a positive sign, the US is deeply mired in economic problems.

True, the Federal Reserve and the Department of Treasury have together tightened credit expansion and they have saved the asset prices for the wealthy and retained jobs for Wall Streets elites. But the majority in the US is still suffering from the economic crisis.

The most recent unemployment rate in the US stood at a staggering 9.7 percent. Consumer spending is sluggish and the housing markets remain choppy. And deficits on both state and federal levels continue to climb as the burden on Social Security increases.

The controversial medical reform has already cost the Obama administration a lot of chips in Capitol Hill. Since columnist Paul Krugman's first shot at the renminbi pegging policy last December, the issue has caught the attentions of politicians such as US Senator Charles Schumer.

The US is running multilateral trade deficits with more than 90 countries and the effect of narrowing its overall trade deficit by relying on revaluing a single currency, the renminbi, is questionable.

The nature of the Sino-US trade imbalance is largely structural. Between 2005 to June 2008, the renminbi has appreciated approximately 21 percent against the dollar. Yet the US trade deficit with China has grown by US$104 billion from 2004-2008. Although politically driven reports in the media have curried US voters in favor of a renminbi revaluation with the caveat that it will create jobs, the truth is that cheap imported goods are driven by demand from US consumers. A stronger renminbi will only divert demands to Mexico, India, Vietnam or whomever can produce cheaper goods.

The $7.2 billion deficit in March shows clearly that the Chinese economy is not export driven. The Sino-US trade imbalance worsened further by the US government's reluctance to export high technology to China. The United States has successfully boosted its economy through high-tech industries in recent decades, yet is still unwilling to share with China, one of its largest trading partners.

China has its own renminbi agenda that is largely founded in economic stability. As President Hu pointed out on the first day of the Nuclear Security Summit, any action must be based on China's own steps to develop the economy. The peg against the dollar at 6.83 renminbi was just one of the numerous policies to cope with the global economic crisis.

The primary goal of China is to boost both the public and private sectors and not to "manipulate" a currency or export the problem to its trading partners. Nevertheless, given the significant size, exports remain crucial to the Chinese economy. Any significant appreciation of the renminbi will erode China's export competitiveness overnight and impact the livelihood of tens of millions of workers.

Any change in Chinese currency policy has to help the government's target GDP growth at a pace of 8 percent per year and the nation's determination to contain the consumer price index. The stimulus package has successfully boosted the Chinese economy. However, with the global economy looming with uncertainties, the Chinese government should not slow down the economic engine nor let inflationary pressures threaten the livelihood of the population. Demands in raw materials, accompanied by the credit expansion have already fueled the consumer price index. The central government has to maneuver its monetary policy delicately to cope with liquidity. While the gradual lifting of interest rates and bank reserve requirements help to moderately cool off the economy, a sizable liquidity is still flowing over to the equity and property markets.

Consumer prices rose 2.7 percent year-on-year in February, which is a significant climb from 1.5 percent in January. A slightly stronger renminbi might ease some of the inflationary pressures to the benefit of the overall economy, and the government has studied this option. But that would largely depend on weighing the losses to exporters against boosting domestic consumer spending in the hopes of minimizing the impact to society. China is aiming to avoid the painful lesson of the yen's appreciation during the '80s.

If the central government changes the currency policy, China will likely allow a limited flotation of the renminbi against the dollar, or appreciate the currency at a reasonable pace not exceeding 5 percent against the dollar within the next 12 months. Of course, this is based on the government's own estimation of how fast the nation can absorb the losses in exports with the gains in Chinese consumers.

(China Daily May 5, 2010)